Executive Integrity, Audit Opinion, and Fraud in Chinese Listed Firms by Chen, Jiandong et al.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Executive Integrity, Audit Opinion, and Fraud in Chinese Listed
Firms
Citation for published version:
Chen, J, Cumming, D, Hou, W & Lee, E 2013, 'Executive Integrity, Audit Opinion, and Fraud in Chinese
Listed Firms' Emerging Markets Review, vol 15, pp. 72-91. DOI: 10.1016/j.ememar.2012.12.003
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1016/j.ememar.2012.12.003
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Emerging Markets Review
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Chen, J., Cumming, D., Hou, W., & Lee, E. (2013). Executive Integrity, Audit Opinion, and Fraud in Chinese
Listed Firms. Emerging Markets Review, 15, 72-91. 10.1016/j.ememar.2012.12.003
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 28. Apr. 2017
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1839449
1 
 
Executive Integrity, Audit Opinion, and Fraud in Chinese Listed 
Firms 
 
Jiandong Chen
a
, Douglas Cumming
b,*
, Wenxuan Hou
c
,
 
and Edward Lee
d 
a School of Public Finance and Taxation, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, China 
b Schulich School of Business, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3, Canada 
c The University of Edinburgh Business School, United Kingdom  
d Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, United Kingdom  
 
Abstract 
 
We examine the influence of auditors on corporate fraud in China. We find lower executive 
integrity firms are associated with higher propensity of regulatory enforcement actions 
against corporate fraud in the subsequent year. We then show that this effect is moderated by 
the issuance of modified audit opinion report by the auditors. This finding implies that 
auditors can serve an early warning role to discourage low integrity executives from engaging 
in corporate fraud. Our results have policy implications for further strengthening auditor 
independence in emerging countries like China.  
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1. Introduction 
 
We examine whether auditors contribute to corporate fraud deterrence in China. Over the past 
decade, a string of high profile corporate frauds and scandals have affected investor 
confidence and financial market stability in Western developed economies. Corporate fraud 
have serious consequences to stakeholders, employees, and the wider society (e.g. 
Szwajkowski, 1985; Davidson and Worrell, 1988; Zahra et al., 2005). For emerging countries 
like China, widespread corporate fraud can impede its aspiring economic development. 
Therefore, understanding what determines and deters corporate fraud in emerging economies 
are interesting research questions that deserves attention. China is especially relevant for 
these issues since it is currently a leading emerging country with rising prominence in world 
economy. However, existing literature on corporate fraud in China has so far focused 
extensively on the internal governance mechanisms (e.g. Chen et al., 2006; Jia et al., 2009; 
Hou and Moore, 2010; Ding et al. 2010) and provided less attention to external governance 
mechanism such as that of auditors. Financial statements provide crucial information to 
outside investors to facilitate their assessment of firms’ future cash flow prospects and 
discount rates. Auditors serve the important role maintaining the credibility of financial 
statements information to ensure that they are true and fair reflection of firms’ performance. 
As a transitional economy, China is assumed to have weak legal enforcement and investor 
protection. Since these institutional features are common in other emerging markets, our 
study has wider implications to other developing economies. 
 
Erhard et al. (2009) define integrity as “a state or condition for being whole, complete, 
unbroken, unimpaired, sound, perfect condition”. They distinguish integrity for an individual 
as being solely a matter of that person’s word, and for a group or organizational entity as 
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being comprised solely of what is said by or on behalf of the group or organization. They 
argue that for these entities to have integrity, they must honor their words. Jensen et al., (2004) 
suggests some areas in finance theory and practice where integrity is lacking and one of this 
is financial reporting choices made to manage what the “street” expects and to give the street 
what it expects. They suggest that managers are motivated to do so because the reactions of 
investors to management performance play a crucial role in determination of a firm’s stock 
prices and capital acquisition ability, and therefore competitiveness. They argue that 
“managing earnings” amounts to lying to shareholders which managers have fiduciary 
responsibility, and taking actions that are anything other than those required to maximize the 
long-run value of the firm. Based on these intuitions, the degree in which firms manage their 
earnings can serve as an empirically observable proxy of executive integrity. Dikolli et al. 
(2012) provide empirical evidence of association between managerial integrity and earnings 
management. They measure CEO integrity based on employee surveys and annual 
shareholder letter. They find CEO integrity measure is positively related to earnings quality 
measured by accruals. 
 
Corporate fraud is defined as the deliberate actions of management to deceive, swindle, or 
cheat investors or other stakeholders (Zahra et al., 2005). Existing literature suggest both 
internal and external determinants of corporate fraud. Some of the internal factors includes 
top management (e.g. Baucus, 1994; Ashforth and Anand, 2003), organization culture (e.g. 
McKendall and Wanger, 1997), and board composition (e.g. Dunn, 2004). Some of the 
external factors includes regulatory condition (e.g. Hou and Moore, 2010), environmental 
hostility (e.g. Baucus and Baucus, 1997), environmental dynamism (e.g. Hansen et al., 1996), 
industry cultures (e.g. Baucus and Near, 1991), industry concentration (e.g. McKendall and 
Wanger, 1997).  Black (2005) classifies corporate fraud into opportunistic and reactive. The 
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former occurs when executives seizes an opportunity for further gain by manipulating 
disclosure and the latter occurs when executives responds to declining firm performance by 
window dressing financial statements. In terms of fraud deterrence, the literature largely 
focuses on internal corporate governance mechanisms. For instance, board independence, the 
existence of an audit committee, and the presence of accounting and banking professionals on 
the committee have been found to decrease the incidence of fraudulent activities (see Beasley, 
1996; Dechow et al., 1996; Beasley et al., 2000; Uzun et al., 2004). Denis et al. (2006) show 
that option intensity in CEO remuneration encourages risk taking and induces fraud, while 
Erickson et al. (2006) show that the exercise of executive options and sales of executive 
stocks are not significantly higher for fraudulent firms. External governance mechanisms 
such as investors, employees analysts, auditors, media, and regulators are relatively less 
examined in the literature. Among them, Dyck et al. (2010) provide evidence that investors 
and auditors contribute less to fraud detection in the US than employees, media and industry 
regulators.  
 
China provides interesting setting to examine the efficacy of deterrence mechanisms against 
due to its institutional settings as a transitional economy. Compared to Western developed 
countries, China known to have weak legal enforcement and shareholder protection (Allen et 
al., 2005) as well as tight control of media (Besley and Prat, 2006) and labor unions. As a 
result, external governance mechanisms are expected to be less effective compared to internal 
governance mechanisms. Indeed, studies of fraud deterrence in China have so far also largely 
focus on internal governance mechanisms and reconfirm inferences of studies based on 
Western developed countries. For instance, lower corporate fraud propensity is documented 
among firms with more independent directors (Chen et al., 2006) and larger supervisory 
board (Jia et al., 2009).  Thus, there is also limited study on the role and efficacy of external 
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fraud deterrence in China given its institutional background. Although such environment 
limits the power of investors, media, and employees, there is no explicit reason to believe that 
auditors cannot play their role as external deterrence mechanism against corporate fraud. In 
fact, we expect the contribution of auditors as fraud deterrence to be greater in China relative 
to Western developed countries where investors, media, and employees are more active. 
 
Auditors play an important role in maintaining the credibility of financial statements issued 
by firms. Positive accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990) stipulates that managers 
have the incentives to manipulate financial statements whenever contracts or regulations are 
based on accounting numbers. Financial statements are an important source of information to 
investors for securities valuation before they commit their capital and for monitoring 
purposes after they commit their capital. Therefore, auditor helps curb the motive of 
managers to window dress their performance and uphold the interest of outside investors due 
to their information disadvantage. The contribution of auditor to facilitate capital acquisition 
(Johnson and Lys, 1990) and reduction of information asymmetry (Datar et al., 1991) is more 
pronounced in weaker than stronger legal environments (Choi and Wong, 2007). Therefore, 
the value of auditors is expected to be high in China since due to the weak legal enforcement 
and shareholder protection. 
 
Given the above discussion on managerial integrity, corporate fraud, Chinese setting, and 
auditors, we formulate our testable research hypotheses. First, we predict firms with lower 
managerial integrity are more likely to instigate corporate fraud. Second, auditors are more 
likely to detect financial statement problems among firms with lower managerial integrity. 
Finally, auditors are able to reduce the propensity of corporate fraud among firms with lower 
managerial integrity. To test these assertions, we apply a sample of Chinese listed firms over 
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the period of 2001 to 2008. We identify corporate fraud cases based on enforcement actions 
by Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CRSC), which is the main regulator of 
Chinese stock market. We measure managerial integrity based on earnings management 
proxies as non-operating income relative to sales. We capture the effect of auditors through 
the issuance of modified audit opinion against financial statements issued by firms. Our 
empirical findings are consistent with all three aforementioned predictions. Our results are 
robust to control of firm characteristics, governance variables, as well as industry and region 
fixed effects. 
 
The main policy implications of our study is that in emerging countries like China, where 
external governance mechanisms are likely to be relatively weaker due to institutional 
background, it would be beneficial to strengthen the quality and independence of auditors. 
Government initiatives could be established to enhance the auditor profession through 
improved training and acquiring expertise from abroad. By increasing the credibility of 
financial statement information, the efficiency financial resource allocation in the capital 
market can be enhanced, and this in turn benefits economic development and growth. In 
terms of connection to other papers in the literature on this topic, our study complements 
other existing studies on auditor issues in China. Previous studies provide evidence that 
Chinese firms avoid more independent auditors (DeFond et al., 2000), and this effect is found 
to be more pronounced in less developed regions (Wang et al., 2008). These findings that 
Chinese firms opportunistically dodge the scrutiny of auditors in less developed regions can 
be interpreted as evidence that auditors are recognized as an influential external governance 
mechanism that outside investors in weak legal environment depend upon. Our findings 
essentially substantiate this conjecture. One potential limitation of our study the way 
managerial integrity is measured in our research design. Dikolli et al. (2012) suggest that it is 
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very difficult to come up with an empirical measure that captures the concept of “honoring 
one’s words”. Critiques may also argue that the earnings management we apply is only an 
indirect measure. For instance, it cannot distinguish between the integrity effects of the 
executives collectively or of the CEO, which perhaps matters more.
2
  
 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops the hypotheses. 
The research design and sample data are introduced in Section 3. Section 4 reports and 
discusses the empirical findings and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
2.1. Fraud and Executive Integrity 
 
Various board characteristics have been identified in the literature as the major determinants 
of fraud. For example, board independence, an audit committee, and directors with 
accounting and financial backgrounds help enhance the monitoring quality of the board 
(Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996; Beasley et al., 2000;Uzun et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2006; 
Firth et al., 2011). Jia et al. (2009) and Ding et al. (2010) find that the supervisory board in 
China has been found to only react passively to regulatory enforcement against fraud by 
increasing the meeting frequencies rather than deterring the occurrence of fraud ex ante. 
Regard the role of institutional blockholders, Hou et al. (2012b) document the effect of 
mutual fund ownership in reducing corporate fraud activities, especially among privatized 
Chinese listed firms.  Hou and Moore (2010) show that the ownership of state shareholder in 
China aggregates agency problems in partially privatized firms, but brings about favorable 
regulatory conditions by playing down the inspection severity in state-controlled firms. For 
the effect of external governance mechanism, Cumming et al. (2011) show that in addition to 
                                                   
2 We thank the Editor for suggesting this. 
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the role of whistle blower discussed in Dyck et al. (2010), analysts can effectively deter fraud 
among the Chinese listed firms. 
 
Although any good governance mechanisms still need to be implemented or coordinated by 
the executives and management continues to be seen as a major corporate governance actor, 
the role of executive integrity has been largely ignored. Cohen et al (2010) suggest that 
personality traits appear to be a major fraud-risk factor. Since CEOs are able to impose 
impediments to information flow to other board members, Nowak and McCabe (2003) point 
out that management integrity is central to the effectiveness of monitoring and control of the 
board. By summarizing a series of his recent works (Fuller and Jensen, 2002, Jensen et al., 
2004, Erhard et al., 2007 and Jensen and Walking, 2010), Jensen (2011) advocates that 
integrity is essential for workability and thus becomes a necessary (but not sufficient) 
condition for value maximization. Instead of referring to a moral or ethical code, Jensen 
(2011) defines integrity as “keeping one’s commitment and promises on time, or 
acknowledging the failure and cleaning up the messy when one have failed to keep a 
commitment or promise”.  
 
Regard the current financial crisis, Jensen and Walking, (2010) and Jensen (2011) further 
conjecture that agency problems might be only half of the story and the other missing half 
would be about integrity. The public also has serious concern about some executive integrity. 
For example, the protesters of the recent Occupy Wall Street campaign begun in late 2011 
were against their insatiable greed. This went well beyond financial corporations and the 
United States. In China, the lack of integrity is also blamed by some minority shareholders as 
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the one of the major reason for the slumping stock market in China
3
. As a response to the 
public concern, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) recently promulgated 
the first regulation about integrity named “Interim Measures for the Supervision and 
Administration of Integrity in the Securities and Futures Markets” which has been effective 
on 1
st
 Sep 2012. The regulation implements an integrity track record for executives, board 
members as well as the employees of key service providers (e.g. underwriters, law firms, 
securities companies, IT service provider and public relations firms etc.)  
 
Although integrity is valuable in both material and non-material terms (Bradford, 2007), 
when the potential gains for violation are believed to be greater than the reputational costs in 
the event the violation is detected, reputational concerns shrink. Jensen et al. (2004) and 
Jensen (2011) list some important areas where integrity is lacking such as usage of 
backdating of options, recommendations of overvalued stocks, and more importantly, 
earnings management in order to give the “street” what it expects. Graham et al. (2005) 
interviewed and surveyed more than 400 executives and find mangers do want to meet or 
beat earnings benchmark, especially analyst consensus forecasts. 78% of surveyed executives 
admit to sacrificing long-term value to smooth earnings. Degorege et al. (1999) provides 
empirical evidence that executives act in self-interests to mange earnings in order to exceed 3 
thresholds, namely reporting positive profits, sustaining recent performance and meeting 
analyst expectation.  
 
Jensen (2011) regard earnings management as lying since it erodes integrity and destroys 
long-run value. Gleason and Mills (2008) provide evidence that the market discounts stock 
price for firms with managed earnings, and such discounts reflect information uncertainty.  
                                                   
3 “Slumping stock market is due to the lack of integrity” in Yangcheng Evening News on 12 Sep 2012. Link: 
http://money.ycwb.com/2012-09/02/content_3941475.htm (in Chinese) 
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Louis (2004) attributes the post-merger underperformance anomaly to the pre-merger 
earnings management. Teoh et al. (1998b) and DuCharme et al. (2011) shows firms with 
extensive earnings management prior to IPOs or in IPO year tend to experience poor stock 
performance in the following three years. Yu et al. (2006) indicate that Chinese firms actively 
engaged in earnings management to meet the minimal ROE (return-on-equity) requirements 
to have rights issues. Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998a) find that earnings management 
around the year of seasoned equity offerings explains a portion of the subsequent lower stock 
and earnings performance. In addition, Skinner and Sloan (2002) show that compare to value 
stocks, growth stocks which enjoy overly optimistic expectations about future earnings 
experience sharper subsequent price decline when expectations are not met. This implies that 
the wealth of existing shareholders are “torpedoed” when the executive mange earnings to 
meet and inflate the expectation of the investors and analysts.  
 
These empirical evidence reinforces Jensen (2011)’s assertion that earnings management 
amounts to lying to the investors to whom managers have a fiduciary responsibility and 
signals a breakdown in integrity. Therefore, we will apply earnings management to proxy the 
lack of integrity in this study. This will enable us to empirically examine the role of integrity 
in fraud occurrence and value maximization, in particular, whether the lack of integrity is an 
antecedent of fraud.  
 
Some impediments of integrity have been identified in the literature. Jensen et al. (2004) note 
that the integrity problem cannot be handled by executive remuneration and the commonly 
used budget-based bonus and promotion systems instead motivate poor integrity. Since 
executives are rewarded in terms of compensation or promotion if they achieve the operating 
targets set in their contracts, Jensen (2003) point out that these budget-based systems reward 
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people for lying, and and punish them for telling the truth. The executive stock and option 
schemes have been also found to stimulate earnings management in that executives with high 
equity incentives are more likely to sell shares in the future and this motivates executives to 
engage in earnings management to increase the price of the shares to be sold (Cheng and 
Warfield, 2005, and Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). Rost (2007) argues that the increasing 
trend to fill CEO openings through external hires in the external labor market also 
discourages executives from investing in integrity and encourages them to invest in 
networking, since a common past between a person and a firm downgrades their promotion 
prospects. 
 
Attributes to promote integrity have also been discussed. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act has been 
found to significantly expand the responsibility of auditors and management. Cohen et al. 
(2010a) find that the requirement such as the executive certification of financial statements 
helps to improve integrity because it mandates the involvement of the managers. Graham et 
al. (2005) show that executives in the post-Sarbanes–Oxley environment become more 
reluctant to manage earnings. Li et al. (2008) document positive abnormal return around the 
SOX events among the firms which heavily mange earnings suggesting that the more 
extensively firms had managed earnings, the more SOX (Sarbanes–Oxley) would constrain 
earnings management, and positive abnormal return around the SOX event among these firms. 
Klein (2002), Kizirian et al. (2005), Martin (2007) and Cohen et al. (2011) find that both 
auditors and audit committees play an important role in assessing and ensuring integrity. 
Under Section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, auditors are required to assess management 
integrity and issue an adverse internal control report noting any material weaknesses in 
internal control (Kizirian et al. 2005). 
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Although various factors encourage or discourage integrity, Fuller and Jensen (2002) point 
out that human choice is critical. Executives with the lack of integrity tend to ignore policies 
and procedures to pursue self-interests at the costs of other investors, and therefore unethical 
decisions and fraudulent behaviors are more likely to flourish among them. Jensen (2011) 
points out that the lack of executive integrity can hold back the workability is an organisation 
in that any theoretically sound governance mechanisms still need to be implemented or 
coordinated by the executives. Kizirian et al. (2005) believe the auditor’s assessment of 
management integrity provides an indirect measure of management’s attitude toward fraud.  
We therefore hypotheses the following  
 
H1: The lack of executive integrity is positively related to the incidence of fraud. 
 
2.2. Auditor and Executive Integrity 
 
The role of auditor in the assessment and assurance of executive integrity has been discussed 
in the literature.  Martin (2007) indicates the demand and challenges for auditors to access the 
integrity and ethical values of clients and suggests the view of ethical infrastructures to be 
used. Nelson et al. (2002) emphasise audit function in thwarting earnings management 
attempts. To evaluating the potential for unethical behaviour associated with fraud, Cohen et 
al. (2010) suggest that auditors should better integrate the managers’ personalities. Audit 
effects and audit quality have been found important. Caramanis and Lennox (2008) show that 
audit effect reflected by audit hours can decrease the extent to which executives are able to 
manage earnings. Becker et al. (1998) find that the clients of Big 6 auditors tend to manage 
earnings to a lesser extent compare to the clients of other auditors, and Carey and Simnett 
(2006) show that the deterioration in audit quality associated with long period of audit partner 
tenure is positively related to the earnings management.  
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Since audit independence is essential for the auditors’ function (Xiang, 1998), studies of 
Chinese auditing issues largely focus on this. DeAngelo (1981), Yang et al. (2003) and 
Krishnan et al. (1996) regard modified audit opinion (MAO) as a proxy for auditor 
independence. Until 1990s, audit independence in China was a big concern because auditors 
played the role of agents of the state audit bureau and bore little economic responsibility for 
their improper auditing actions, such as pleasing their clients or pursuing their own interests. 
(DeFond et al., 2000; Yang et al., 2001). In addition, the shortage of qualified accountants 
and auditors also held back the development of professional auditing (Xiao, 2000). Since then, 
a set of reforms has helped improve audit independence in China. DeFond et al. (2000) find 
that new auditing standards promulgated in 1995 which prescribed detailed auditing 
procedures has made auditors less likely to succumb to management pressure in issuing clean 
opinions when modified options are appropriate. A program launched in 1997 aimed to 
further enhance audit independence operationally by disaffiliating CPA firms from their 
sponsoring body and make them financially and operationally independent. Yang et al., 2001 
document that the number (percentage) of modified aud increased from four to 152 (2.20% to 
18%) following the reform because partners became liable for their auditing practices and 
profits are also retained within the firm for distribution among partners in disaffiliated firms.  
 
These studies were conducted at the market level. For the determinants of audit opinion at the 
firm level in China, DeFond et al. (2000) find that clients receiving modified audit opinions 
tend to be those with poor operating performance, lower current ratios, and larger size, and 
the auditors issuing more modified opinions tend to be larger auditors and joint venture 
auditors. Firth et al. (2007) argue audit opinion also reflects the informativeness of earnings 
and find that private firms and firms with a larger supervisory board and a greater percentage 
14 
 
of independent directors are more likely to receive clean audit opinions. Firth et al. (2011a) 
show that auditors tend to issue qualified audit opinions for firms that incur financial 
restatements as a rational response to the increased audit risk. Firth et al. (2011b) note that the 
organizational form of audit firms can affect their opinion: A partnership firm (limited 
liability firm) has more (less) wealth at risk and larger (smaller) risk and liability exposure, 
and therefore tends to issue qualified (clean) audit opinions.  
 
Since the executives with lower levels of integrity have higher preliminary risk assessments 
(Kizirian et al., 2005) and Chen et al. (2001) provide empirical evidence that earnings 
management for meeting the regulatory profitability requirements increases the frequency of 
receiving modified audit opinion (MAO) in China, we argue that executives with the lack of 
integrity are less likely to give a true and fair view in financial statements that complies with 
relevant regulations and requirements. We thereby hypothesize the following 
 
H2: The lack of executive integrity is associated with a higher incidence of modified audit 
opinion. 
 
2.3. Auditor and Fraud Prevention 
 
Academics, investors, and policy makers focus on the role of auditors as fraud 
whistleblowers, capable of and responsible for detecting and reporting fraudulent activities. 
Dyck et al. (2010) document that auditors account for 10% of detected fraud, which is larger 
than the figure from the regulatory commission (7%) and smaller than that from employees 
(17%), non-financial market regulators (13%), and the media (13%). On the one hand, 
auditors who blow the whistle are more likely to lose the accounts of the fraud-committing 
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firms; on the other hand, if they fail to report fraud, the regulatory commission imposes 
administrative sanctions in the form of warnings, fines, and the withdrawal of auditors’ 
licenses. Yang et al. (2001) show that the number of administrative sanctions against auditors 
increased from 100 to about 500 during 1994–1997. During the sample period 1996–2002 of 
Firth et al. (2005), 72 auditors, which are less competent and independent, are sanctioned by 
the regulatory commission for failing to identify material misstatement frauds from listed 
companies (e.g., revenue-related frauds).  
 
We argue that auditors can intervene in the process in which the lack of integrity is developed 
into serious fraudulent activities by issuing modified audit opinion (MAO). Chen et al. (2000) 
document that MAO could lead to negative cumulative abnormal returns showing it MAO is 
interpreted by the market as bad news about the company, and the MAOs attract a lot of 
attention from the investors and the media presumably because of the lack of competing 
information sources in China. Haw et al. (2003) show that in addition to the pricing effect, 
MAOs could delay the annual earnings announcement. Such delay may further build up the 
suspicions and concern from the investors. Therefore, we argue that the increased attention 
brought by MAOs can put executives under closer scrutiny of the investors, media and the 
board and allow fewer chances for executives with poor integrity to commit fraud. On the 
contrary, if executives with the lack of integrity do not incur MAO as a warning from 
auditors, the poor integrity could further deteriorate into more serious malpractice. We 
thereby hypothesize the following 
 
H3: Modified audit opinion helps deter executives with the lack of integrity from committing 
fraud. 
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3. Sample and Research Design 
 
 
There are two categories of audit opinions in China: standard unqualified opinions and 
nonstandard ones. Standard unqualified opinions are issued when a financial statement is true 
and free from material misstatements, whereas the nonstandard ones are issued when audit 
firms identify some problem therein (See Yang et al. 2001).  The nonstandard opinion is also 
known as modified audit opinion (MAO) which refers to both qualified opinions and 
unqualified opinions with explanatory notes in China. Chen et al. (2000) indicate that the 
latter serves as an alternative form of a qualified opinion in China, and no significant 
difference in market reaction is documented between the qualified opinions and unqualified 
opinions with explanatory notes. The data of modified audit opinions are mainly from China 
Securities Market & Accounting Research (GTA/CSMAR). We include all Chinese listed 
firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges (excluding firms listed in ChiNext board, 
the China's second board market for small and medium enterprises launched in 2009, and B-
stocks which are denoted in Hong Kong or US dollars). The final observation is 10,317 firm-
year. The sample covers the period from 2001 to 2008, because most of the corporate 
governance variables used in this paper are only available since 2001. In addition, the sample 
of corporate fraud is from the China Center for Economic Research (CCER). Both databases 
are commonly used in studies of the Chinese capital market.  
 
To empirically test the predictions in H1, we apply the following logistic regression model  
   
k
k tkktt
RegionIndustryYearControlEMFraud
1 ,1101

 
   (1)
 
where Fraud is a one-year led dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is subject to 
regulatory enforcement against fraud, and zero otherwise. It is worth to notice that to what 
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extend the detected fraud could proxy the committed fraud depends on the inspection severity. 
Hou and Moore (2010) show that the inspection severity in China has been substantially 
improved as a result of regulatory reform: the state-controlled firms became much less likely 
to enjoy favourable regulatory conditions. This finding helps us to justify the proxy in that 
firms tend to experience indifferent inspection severity.  
 
Following the intuition of Jensen (2011), the lack of integrity is proxied by two earnings 
management measures. The variable EM is the ratio of non-operating income relative to sales 
(Bertrand et al., 2002). It is estimated on yearly basis. Chen and Yuan (2004), Jian and Wong 
(2004), and Ding et al. (2007) argue that this variable is superior to accruals for measuring 
earnings management in China for two reasons. First, related-party transactions are 
commonly observed in China, making it easy for firms to use non-core operating income to 
manipulate earnings. Second, Jian and Wong (2004) and Ding et al. (2007) add that China’s 
traditionally tax-oriented accounting system makes firms unlikely to adjust their earnings via 
non-cash accruals. Ding et al. (2007) further show that the significant correlation between the 
ratio of non-operating income to sales and discretionary accruals is as large as 0.5. To 
account for industry traits, we propose another measure for robustness checks, namely DEM, 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if EM is equal to or above the median value of EM from the 
firms within the same industry in the same year, and 0 otherwise. The industry is classified 
based on the first two digits of the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) codes.  
The dummy variable DEM is also estimated yearly. To support the Hypothesis 1, we need 
observe significantly positive coefficients of EM and DEM.   
 
A set of control variables is incorporated to control for the effects of firm characteristics, 
performance, and corporate governance, including the natural logarithm of market 
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capitalization (Size), the price-to-book ratio (PB), a dummy variable of delisting risk (ST is 
equal to one if a listed firm experiences at least two consecutive year losses and labelled as 
Special Treatment by the regulatory commission in the Chinese stock market, and zero 
otherwise), analyst following (Analysts is obtained as the natural logarithm of result of one 
plus the number of analysts who write reports on the firm), fund ownership (Fund is the 
number of shares held by open- and closed-end funds relative to the total number of shares), 
the number of restricted shares relative to the total number of shares (Restricted), the 
Herfindahl index of the 10 largest firm blockholders (Ownership), a dummy variable of 
duality (Duality is equal to one if the CEO also holds the position of board chair, and zero 
otherwise), a dummy variable for board meeting frequency (Meeting is equal to one if the 
number of board meetings is above the median value of yearly observations, and zero 
otherwise), a dummy variable of board size (Bosize is equal to one if the number of board 
members is above the median value of yearly observations, and zero otherwise), a dummy 
variable of board independence (Indep is equal to one if the ratio of independent directors is 
above the median value of yearly observations, and zero otherwise), and a dummy variable 
for supervisory board size (Supsize is equal to one if the number of supervisory board 
members is above the median value of yearly observations, and zero otherwise). Regional 
and industry effects are also controlled for. Corporate fraud, industry codes, delisting risk 
(ST), the ratio of restricted to total shares (Restricted), and ownership concentration 
(Ownership) data are from the China Center for Economic Research (CCER), and the rest of 
the variables are constructed based on data from China Securities Market & Accounting 
Research (GTA/CSMAR). Most of the control variables in the list have been empirically 
tested in the literature. Board meeting frequency (Meeting) and ownership concentration 
(Ownership) have been found to be negatively related to the fraud incidence, whereas the 
delisting risk (ST) to be positively related (Hou and Moore, 2010). The restricted shares ratio 
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(Restricted) is incorporate to capture the impact of the institutional shareholders (mainly state 
shareholders and its agencies) in China. Hou et al. (2012a) find that restricted shares in China 
deteriorate the information environment presumably because restricted shareholders have 
greater incentives to conceal their self-serving deeds.  
 
Following Firth et al. (2006), firms are grouped into four regions based on levels of economic 
development to construct the regional dummy variables: (1) firms located in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen, (2) firms located in more developed areas, including the open cities and provinces 
along the coast, (3) firms located in the inland provinces, and (4) firms located in the least 
developed area, in the northwestern part of the country. The industry dummy variables are 
constructed based on the first two digits of the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) 
codes. Year dummy is also incorporated to control for the time trend, and clustering of 
standard errors is adjusted for the panel data. To support our Hypothesis 1, we need observe a 
significant and positive α1, showing the lack of integrity is associated with a higher incidence 
of fraudulent activities. 
 
To test H2, we apply the following logistic model with the dependent variable as a dummy 
variable of modified audit opinions (MAO is equal to one if a modified audit opinion is issued, 
and zero otherwise): 
    
k
k tkktt
RegionIndustryYearControlEMMAO
1 ,110     
(2)
 
where the lack of executive integrity is proxied by EM and DEM, as defined earlier. We do 
not take one-year lead for MAO because it is issued for the problems in the financial report of 
the same year. The corporate governance measures contain such external features as analyst 
following (Analyst), fund ownership (Fund), and internal features such as the ratio of 
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restricted to total shares (Restricted), ownership concentration (Ownership), CEO duality, 
(Duality), board meeting frequency (Meeting), board size (Bosize), board independence 
(Indep), and supervisory board size (Supsize). Firm characteristics (Size, PB), delisting risk 
(ST) and regional and industry effects are also controlled. Chen et al. (2001) and Firth el al. 
(2011) find that delisting risk increase the incidence of modified audit opinion. To support 
our Hypotheses 2 that executives are more likely to receive modified audit opinion when they 
are associated with worse integrity reflected by more extensive earnings management, we 
need to observe positive coefficients 1 for EM and DEM.  
 
Finally, H3 can be tested by using the the following logistic regression model: 



   
RegionIndustryYear
ControlMAOEMMAOEMFraud
k
k tkkttttt 3 ,132101
    
  (3)
 
where the one-year lead dependent dummy variable Fraud is equal to one if the firm is 
subject to regulatory enforcement against fraud, and zero otherwise; poor integrity is proxied 
by two earnings management measures EM and DEM; and MAO is equal to one if a modified 
audit opinion is issued to indicate problems with a financial statement, and zero otherwise. 
The variable MAO is also interacted with EM and DEM, respectively, and the same set of 
control variables is incorporated. To support H3, the coefficient of the interaction term α3 
needs to be significantly negative, showing that when executives with lower integrity receive 
warning from the auditors in the form of modified audit opinion, they become less likely to 
take a turn for the worse to exacerbate their unethical behaviour. 
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4. Empirical Findings 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 shows that the number (ratio) of modified audit opinions (MAOs) in the beginning 
of the sample period, from 2001 to 2002, was around 140 (12%). The figures are slightly 
smaller than these reported by Yang et al. (2001) for the year of 1998. One year later, the 
number (ratio) dropped to around 80 (7%) in 2003, then reverted back in 2005, and fell again 
in the end of the sample period in 2008. The trend is different from the upward one 
documented by Yang et al. (2001). Given that corporate governance, audit independence, and 
regulatory supervision have been improved in China in the past decade, the downward 
diagram may imply that the quality of financial statements has improved at the market level, 
consistent with the finding in Hou et al. (2012a) that the informativeness of Chinese stocks 
has been improved. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in this study. The ratio of 
modified audit opinions is 9.31%, on average, and the ratio of fraud is smaller, at about 4%. 
The ratio of non-operating profits to sales is around 2%. Table 1 also reports the summary 
statistics for the split sample, namely, firms with standard opinions and these with modified 
audit opinions. Firms with modified audit opinion are associated with a substantially higher 
incidence of fraud in the subsequent period (21.12% versus 2.16%), lower executive integrity 
as reflected by more severe earnings management (5.86% versus 1.53%), smaller firms, 
growth firms, much higher delisting risk, lower analyst following, lower fund ownership 
(0.33% versus 3.00%), lower ownership concentration, a higher incidence of CEO duality; 
lower board meeting frequencies, and lower board independence. These findings are in 
22 
 
favour of our Hypothesis 2 that the incidence of modified audit opinions is associated with 
poor integrity.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for the variables used in this study. Fraud and earnings 
management are positively related to each other, providing supporting evidence for our 
Hypothesis 1 that poor integrity tends to induce subsequent fraud. Modified audit opinion and 
earnings management are found to be positively related as predicted in Hypothesis 2. In 
addition, both fraud and modified audit opinion are negatively related to the delisting risk (ST) 
and external corporate quality as indicated by the analyst following and fund ownership.  
 
4.2. Test of H1 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the test of H1. We examine whether lower executive integrity 
tend to commit fraud in the subsequent period. The lack of integrity is measured by earnings 
management, the ratio of non-operating profits to sales (EM) in regression I to III and by the 
dummy variable (DEM) indicating whether the level of earnings management (EM) is equal 
to or above the industry median level of the yearly observation in regressions IV to VI. The 
regressions I and IV only incorporate the key variable and firm characteristics, regressions II 
and V also consider the corporate governance and delisting risk, and the regression III and VI 
control for year, industry and region effects. We find that the coefficients of EM are 
significantly positive as 2.2355, 0.9538, and 1.2296, respectively in regression I, II, and III, 
and therefore support our hypothesis H1, suggesting the lack of executive integrity tends to 
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be the antecedent of future fraud at firm level. In other words, fraud is more likely to be 
instigated in firms with poor executive integrity. For robustness checks, we replicate the test 
by replacing EM with DEM, and consistent results are documented in regressions IV to VI. 
This suggests that the executives who manage earnings more severe than the median level of 
firms from the same industry of the same year are more likely to commit fraud in the 
following year.   
 
In addition, firms with imminent delisting risk (ST=1) are more likely to commit fraud 
presumably because they may take opportunistic actions to prevent for being delisted (Hou 
and Moore, 2010). Analyst following, ownership concentration, firm size, and board meeting 
frequency are found to help deter fraudulent activities. Cumming et al. (2011) suggests 
financial analysts help to form a part of the external governance mechanism to enhance the 
monitoring and therefore reduce the incidence of fraud. Uzun et al. (2004) argue that 
increased meeting frequency could also make the board better perform their monitoring duty. 
Chung et al. (2002) find that the presence of large institutional shareholdings promotes the 
monitoring of executives.  
 
4.3. Test of H2  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 4 presents the test of whether the auditor could effective identify the executive with 
poor integrity who manage earnings and issue modified opinion to them as a warning. We 
regress a dummy variable of modified audit opinion (MAO is equal to one if modified 
opinion report is issued by the auditor, and zero otherwise) against the lack of integrity and a 
set of control variables. The lack of integrity is measured by the ratio of non-operating 
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income relative to revenue (EM) in regression I to III and by dummy variable DEM in 
regression IV to VI. The coefficient of DM is significantly positive as 4.5384 in regression I. 
When we control the corporate governance and delisting risk in regression II as well as year, 
industry, and region effects in regression III, the results remain consistent and support 
Hypothesis 2 that executive with poor integrity is like to receive warning from auditors. This 
finding also confirms the monitoring role played by the auditors. For robustness checks, we 
again replace EM with DEM and find that its coefficients remain significantly positive across 
three regressions IV to VI.  In addition, the results show that delisting risk (ST) increases the 
incidence of modified audit opinion. Analyst following and fund ownership are found to 
decrease the incidence. Similar results were documented in Firth et al. (2007). Regard the 
internal governance features, ownership concentration, board meeting frequency and board 
independence are found to reduce the incidence of modified opinions. This is consistent with 
the finding in Chen et al. (2012).  
 
4.4. Test of H3 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
The results for the test of H3 are reported in Table 5. To investigate whether auditors can 
intervene in the deteriorating process of poor executive integrity into fraud, we regress the 
one-year lead dependent dummy variable Fraud against the lack of executive integrity, 
modified audit opinion (MAO), and their interaction term. Again, the executive integrity is 
measured by EM and DEM. The coefficients of EM are significantly positive at 3.2992 from 
regressions I. These findings reinforce Hypothesis 1 that executives with poor integrity tend 
to commit fraud if they do not receive warning from auditors. When the delisting risk, 
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governance quality are incorporated and year, industry, region effects are controlled in 
regressions II and III, the results remain consistent.    
 
More importantly, capturing the intervention effects of audits, the coefficient of the 
interaction term (EM.MAO) is significantly negative across regressions I to III. This supports 
our Hypothesis 3 that the modified audit opinion issued on the executives with poor integrity 
could effectively deter them aggravate their unethical behaviour into fraud.  As shown earlier, 
auditors could effectively identify and warn the executives with poor integrity by issuing 
modified audit opinion. Such opinion can depress the stock performance, attract attention 
from investors and media (Chen et al., 2000), and delay the annual earnings announcement 
(Haw et al., 2003), implying a modified audit opinion can alert the public and thus put the 
executives lacking integrity under closer scrutiny, leaving them fewer chances for 
malpractice. The results suggest a crucial role played by auditor’s role in enhancing the 
disciplining the executive with poor integrity and intervene the deterioration of unethical 
behaviour. We again replicate the tests by replacing EM with DEM in regressions IV to VI 
for robustness checks and obtain consistent results as shown in Table 5, further supporting 
Hypothesis 3.  
 
It is also worth to note that in addition to the role of disciplining executives, modified audit 
opinion is also found to predict fraud as indicated by the significant positive coefficients of 
MAO across the regressions, which suggest a positive association between the modified audit 
opinions on firms which less manage earnings and the future fraud. Firth et al. (2005) the 
reasons other than the earnings management for a firm to receive modified audit opinion, 
such as external loan guarantees and litigation cases. A possible explanation for the result is 
that these unethical behaviours, which normally involve other parties, tend to be much more 
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serious and beyond the personal integrity issues of the executives. Even the executives are 
caught and received warning, they find them much more difficult to correct or deal with 
compare to the earnings management. This may imply that the monitoring role of auditors is 
effective on the break-down of personal integrity such as earnings management, but not on 
the serious unethical behaviours which are possibly due to the governance system failure. 
Another possible explanation is that firms with different levels of earnings management react 
to the modified audit opinion asymmetrically. For example, the modified audit opinion fails 
to trigger adequate scrutiny of managerial actions on the firms with low earnings 
management as a result of the misplaced trust
4
. There could be other possible explanations 
and this could be an issue for future research.   
 
4.5. Robustness Checks 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
In untabulated tests, the results do not materially change when we replace the dummy 
variables of the governance quality by using the continuous value, replace the restricted share 
ratio by state share ratio or a dummy variable to indicate whether the listed firm is a state-
controlled or not, control for the audit quality measured by whether the listed firm is audited 
by one of the Big 4 auditing firms. More importantly, we replicate the test by replacing EM 
with the change in earnings management, ChEM which is calculated as the difference 
between the earnings management in year t and year t-1. The executive integrity is not 
constant, but influenced by various external factors such as governance mechanism (Jensen, 
2003), human resource management (Rost, 2007) as discussed earlier and possibly also 
personal experience. The results are reported in Table 6. The coefficients of ChEM are 
                                                   
4 We thank the anonymous referee for making this point. 
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significantly positive across the three regressions, showing that the deterioration of integrity 
leads to an increase in the incidence of future fraud. This again empirically verifies our 
Hypothesis 1. Capturing the role of modified audit opinion in fraud deterrence, the 
coefficients of the interaction term (ChEM.MAO) are significantly negative across even after 
controlling for delisting risks, governance, and year, industry and region fixed effects. This 
again supports Hypothesis 3 that when when auditors detect the worsened executive integrity 
and impose warning on them, these executives become less likely to commit fraud in the 
subsequent period.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines the efficacy of auditors as external governance mechanism to curb 
corporate fraudulent behaviour among Chinese listed firms with higher earnings manipulation, 
which we use as proxy of low managerial integrity. Corporate fraud reduces the confidence 
of outside investors and the stability of capital market, which in turn hampers the growth and 
development of emerging countries. China is a leading emerging economy and provides 
suitable setting to study the contribution of auditors to corporate fraud deterrence because it 
has weak legal enforcement and investor protection along with tight control of media and 
labor union. Under this institutional environment, other external governance mechanisms 
such as investors, media, and employees are expected to be less effective in deterring 
managerial opportunism as their counterparts in Western developed economies. This leaves 
auditors to serve as one of the few credible sources of external governance mechanisms 
capable of discouraging opportunistic behaviour of managers.  
 
Indeed, our empirical evidence suggest that Chinese listed firms with greater degree of 
earnings manipulation, which we assume have lower managerial integrity, are associated with 
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greater likelihood of regulatory enforcement actions against corporate fraud, but this effect is 
moderated by issuance of modified audit opinion moderates. Since the underlying motive of 
earnings manipulation and corporate fraud is broadly similar, one would argue that it is not 
surprising to find a significant relationship between the former and latter. Critics could also 
argue that the correlation between of managerial integrity and corporate fraud is not an 
unexpected finding either, irrespective of the empirical proxy of the former that we apply. 
However, what is interesting from our observation is that, on the average, the issuance of 
modified audit opinion for firms with high earnings manipulation or low managerial integrity 
significantly reduces subsequent occurrence of corporate fraud identification by regulatory 
authority. What this suggests is that auditors in China serve as effective early warning 
mechanism to expose and discourage managerial opportunism from escalating into corporate 
fraud. 
 
As an increasingly influential emerging economy, the challenges and experiences of China’s 
development have useful implications to other developing countries. The main policy 
implication of our study is that in countries with similar institutional background as China, it 
is important to strengthen the quality and independence of the auditing profession in order to 
realize its full potential and value as external governance mechanism. Auditors can play a 
crucial role to improve the credibility of financial statements issued by firms, which in turn 
reduces the information disadvantage of outside investors. Armed with better financial 
information, outside investors are more capable of making correct investment decisions to 
channel their capital to firms with growth opportunities, which in turn benefits the wider 
economy.  
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Appendix. Variable Definitions 
 
Fraud 
 
A dummy variable equal to one if the firm is subject to regulatory enforcement against 
fraud, and zero otherwise. 
EM 
 
Earnings management is the ratio of non-operating income relative to revenue. It is used to 
proxy for the lack of integrity of executives.  
DEM 
 
 
A dummy of earnings management. It is equal to one if the ratio of non-operating income 
relative to revenue is above the median value of the firms in the same industry of the same 
year, and zero otherwise.  
MAO 
 
A dummy variable equal to one if a modified audit opinion is issued by the auditor, which 
indicates (potential) problems with a financial statement, and zero otherwise. 
 
The following control variables are lagged for one year to resolve the causality problem: 
 
Size The natural logarithm of market capitalization. 
PB Price-to-book ratio. 
ST 
 
A dummy variable equal to one if a listed firm experiences two or more consecutive years 
of loss and labelled as Special Treatment by the regulatory comission, and zero otherwise. 
Analyst The natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following the firm. 
Fund The number of shares held by mutual funds relative to the total number of shares. 
Restricted The number of restricted shares relative to the total number of shares.  
Ownership The Herfindahl index of the top 10 largest firm blockholders. 
Duality 
 
A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO holds the position of board chair, and zero 
otherwise. 
Meeting 
 
A dummy variable equal to one if the number of board meetings is above the median value 
of yearly observations, and zero otherwise. 
Bosize 
 
A dummy variable equal to one if the number of board members is above the median value 
of yearly observations, and zero otherwise. 
Indep 
 
A dummy variable equal to one if the ratio of independent directors is above the median 
value of yearly observations, and zero otherwise. 
Supsize 
 
A dummy variable equal to one if the number of supervisory board members is above the 
median value of yearly observations, and zero otherwise. 
 
 
The following industry and regional dummies are also incorporated in our empirical analyses. 
 
The industry dummies are constructed based on the first two digits of the GICS codes. 
 
The regional dummies are constructed according to Firth et al. (2006), who group firms into four 
different regions by level of economic development: (1) Shanghai and Shenzhen, (2) the more 
developed areas, including the open cities and provinces along the coast, (3) the inland provinces, and 
(4) the least developed area, in the northwestern part of the country. 
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Figure 1 
 
This figure shows the number and ratio of modified audit opinion (MAO) from 2001 to 2008 in the 
Chinese stock market. Modified audit opinions indicate (potential) problems with financial statements. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
 
All firms Firms with MAO 
 
Firms without MAO Difference in Mean Test 
   Median  Mean  Std.Dev.  Median  Mean  Std.Dev.  Median  Mean  Std.Dev.  Difference  t-Value 
MAO 0.0000 0.0931 0.2907 
   Fraud 0.0000 0.0393 0.1942 0.0000 0.0216 0.1453 0.0000 0.2112 0.4084 -0.1896 -30.06
*** 
EM 0.0032 0.0193 0.0655 0.0030 0.0153 0.0501 0.0054 0.0586 0.1415 -0.0433 -19.87
*** 
DEM 0.0000 0.4998 0.5000 0.0000 0.4834 0.4998 1.0000 0.6587 0.4744 -0.1753 -10.40
*** 
Size 20.4613 20.5797 0.9999 20.5170 20.6397 0.9931 19.9633 19.9955 0.8694 0.6443 19.36
*** 
PB 2.6209 3.7035 3.9615 2.6144 3.6124 3.3787 2.7808 4.5902 7.5187 -0.9778 -7.31
*** 
ST 0.0000 0.0802 0.2716 0.0000 0.0470 0.2117 0.0000 0.4027 0.4907 -0.3557 -41.81
*** 
Analyst 0.0000 0.6386 0.9133 0.0000 0.6908 0.9355 0.0000 0.1310 0.3887 0.5597 18.38
*** 
Fund 0.0009 0.0275 0.0626 0.0016 0.0300 0.0650 0.0000 0.0033 0.0187 0.0267 12.68
*** 
Restricted 0.5702 0.5397 0.1651 0.5706 0.5395 0.1661 0.5692 0.5420 0.1550 -0.0025 -0.46 
Ownership 0.1708 0.2062 0.1367 0.1773 0.2104 0.1374 0.1251 0.1659 0.1221 0.0445 9.66
*** 
Duality 0.0000 0.0098 0.0985 0.0000 0.0091 0.0949 0.0000 0.0166 0.1280 -0.0076 -2.27
** 
Meeting 1.0000 0.5776 0.4940 1.0000 0.5838 0.4930 1.0000 0.5172 0.5000 0.0666 3.98
*** 
Bosize 0.0000 0.3726 0.4835 0.0000 0.3751 0.4842 0.0000 0.3486 0.4768 0.0265 1.62 
Indep 1.0000 0.7754 0.4173 1.0000 0.7830 0.4122 1.0000 0.7014 0.4579 0.0817 5.79
*** 
Supsize 1.0000 0.8991 0.3012 1.0000 0.8997 0.3004 1.0000 0.8928 0.3095 0.0069 0.68 
Obs. 10,317 9,356 961 
 
     This table presents the descriptive statistics for the total sample and firm subsamples with and without modified audit opinion. The variable MAO equals one if 
a modified audit opinion is issued by the auditor, which indicates (potential) problems with a financial statement, and zero otherwise; Fraud is equal to one if 
the firm is subject to regulatory enforcement against fraud, and zero otherwise; EM is the ratio of non-operating income relative to revenue; and DEM is a 
dummy variable equal to one if EM is above the industry median value of yearly observations, and zero otherwise. Other variables are defined in the Appendix. 
The sample period covers 2001 to 2008. 
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Table 2  
Correlation analyses  
  Fraud EM DEM MAO Size PB ST Analyst Fund Restricted Ownership Duality Meeting Bosize Indep Supsize 
Fraud 1                               
EM 0.0687* 1                              
DEM 0.0535* 0.2752* 1                           
MAO 0.2838* 0.1920* 0.1019* 1                         
Size -0.0990* -0.0603* -0.0821* -0.1873* 1                       
PB 0.0266* 0.1136* 0.0442* 0.0717* 0.1636* 1                     
ST 0.1131* 0.3329* 0.1183* 0.3807* -0.2203* 0.1845* 1                   
Analyst -0.1048* -0.0840* -0.0850* -0.1781* 0.5078* -0.004 -0.1696* 1                 
Fund -0.0700* -0.0619* -0.0808* -0.1238* 0.4860* 0.1036* -0.1215* 0.6094* 1               
Restricted -0.0022 -0.0474* -0.0257* 0.0045 -0.3319* 0.0223 -0.0094 -0.1297* -0.1840* 1             
Ownership -0.0692* -0.0788* -0.0817* -0.0947* 0.0244 -0.0484* -0.1016* 0.0490* -0.0443* 0.5724* 1           
Duality 0.0002 0.0336* 0.0109 0.0223 -0.0012 0.0148 0.0105 -0.0208 -0.0026 -0.0316* -0.0351* 1         
Meeting -0.0515* -0.0402* -0.0620* -0.0392* -0.0482* -0.0334* -0.0525* -0.0246 -0.0222 0.0459* 0.0391* -0.0126 1       
Bosize -0.0082 -0.0512* -0.0165 -0.0159 0.0367* -0.0400* -0.0555* 0.0648* 0.0052 0.1020* 0.0239 0.0048 0.0510* 1     
Indep -0.0252 0.0143 0.0004 -0.0569* 0.0445* -0.0596* -0.0019 0.2142* 0.1199* -0.1517* -0.0882* 0.004 -0.0445* -0.1272* 1   
Supsize -0.0135 -0.0437* -0.0243 -0.0067 0.0380* -0.0124 -0.0410* -0.0429* -0.0047 -0.0241 0.0351* -0.0223 -0.0194 -0.0067 -0.0345* 1 
                 This table presents the correlation matrix of the variables. The variable Fraud is equal to one if the firm is subject to regulatory enforcement against disclosed fraud, and zero 
otherwise; EM is the ratio of non-operating income relative to revenue; DEM is a dummy variable equal to one if EM is above the median value of yearly observations, and zero 
otherwise; and MAO equals one if a modified audit opinion is issued by the auditor, which indicates (potential) problems with a financial statement, and zero otherwise. The other 
variables are defined in the Appendix. The sample period covers 2001 to 2008. The superscript * denote the 1% level of significance. 
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Table 3  
Relationship between fraud and earnings management (test of hypothesis H1) 
  Regression I Regression II Regression III Regression IV Regression V Regression VI 
EM 2.2355 (4.83) *** 0.9538 (1.80) * 1.2296 (2.13) **     
  
    
  
    
  
DEM                  0.4566 (4.25) *** 0.305 (2.81) *** 0.3052 (2.56) 
*** 
Size -0.6031 (-9.12) *** -0.3341 (-3.93) *** -0.2013 (-1.58)  -0.6027 (-9.00) *** -0.3241 (-3.83) *** -0.1976 (-1.56)  
PB 0.0294 (2.91) *** 0.0096 (0.97) 
  
0.0180 (1.53) 
 
0.0341 (3.40) *** 0.0098 (0.99)   0.0179 (1.52)   
ST       0.538 (3.43) *** 0.5901 (3.65) ***       0.5785 (3.97) *** 0.6464 (4.32) 
*** 
Analyst       -0.718 (-5.89) *** -0.7244 (-5.29) ***       -0.7156 (-5.89) *** -0.7206 (-5.28) 
*** 
Fund       -4.2348 (-1.37) 
  
-4.6779 (-1.46) 
 
      -4.1589 (-1.35)   -4.6182 (-1.45)   
Restricted       0.036 (0.09) 
  
-0.3442 (-0.59) 
 
      0.0533 (0.13)   -0.3005 (-0.52)   
Ownership       -2.7719 (-5.26) *** -2.6523 (-3.90) ***       -2.761 (-5.23) *** -2.6405 (-3.87) 
*** 
Duality       -0.3086 (-0.60) 
  
-0.2227 (-0.44) 
 
      -0.3039 (-0.59)   -0.2053 (-0.41)   
Meeting       -0.5113 (-4.91) *** -0.5258 (-4.83) ***       -0.4966 (-4.77) *** -0.5108 (-4.67) 
*** 
Bosize       0.0328 (0.30) 
  
-0.0343 (-0.25) 
 
      0.0277 (0.25)   -0.0405 (-0.30)   
Indep       -0.1765 (-1.47) 
  
-0.1429 (-1.00) 
 
      -0.1751 (-1.46)   -0.1424 (-0.99)   
Supsize       -0.1907 (-1.20) 
  
-0.2177 -(1.28) 
 
      -0.1969 (-1.24)   -0.2192 (-1.29)   
Constant 8.8909 (6.64) *** 4.7972 (2.60) *** 1.9946 (0.73)  8.6666 (6.34) *** 4.4279 (2.39) ** 1.7709 (0.65) 
 
          
 
   
   
  
Industry effect   No     No     Yes     No     No     Yes   
Region effect   No     No     Yes     No     No     Yes   
Year effect   No     No     Yes     No     No     Yes   
Pseudo-R2   0.0424     0.0914     0.1076 
  
  0.0427     0.0929     0.1085   
Obs.   10,317 
  
  10,317 
    10,317     10,317     10,317     10,317   
          
 
   
   
  
This table present the empirical results of the logistic regression model as follows: 
   
k
k tkktt
RegionIndustryYearControlEMFraud
1 ,1101

 
where the one-year lead dependent dummy variable Fraud is equal to one if the firm is subject to regulatory enforcement against fraud, and zero otherwise; the lack of integrity is 
proxied by following the two earning management measures: EM is the ratio of non-operating income relative to revenue, and DEM is a dummy variable equal to one if EM is 
above the median value of the firms from the same industry in the same year, and zero otherwise. Other control variables are defined in the Appendix. The sample period covers 
2001 to 2008. All t-statistics are reported and adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The superscripts 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Relationship between modified audit opinion and earnings management 
  Regression I Regression II Regression III Regression IV Regression V Regression VI 
EM 4.5384 (11.6) *** 1.6750 (4.41) *** 1.8054 (4.18) ***     
  
    
  
    
  
DEM                   0.5977 (8.20) *** 0.3861 (4.94) *** 0.3819 (4.23) *** 
Size -0.8172 (-17.6) *** -0.3600 (-6.14) *** -0.4134 (-3.87) *** -0.8169 (-17.73) *** -0.3440 (-5.90) *** -0.4100 (-3.84) *** 
PB 0.0485 (5.63) *** 0.0061 (0.73) 
 
0.0010 (0.09) 
 
0.0569 (6.90) *** 0.0066 (0.79) 
 
0.0011 (0.10) 
 
ST       1.8802 (18.96) *** 1.9762 (15.45) ***       1.9589 (20.6) *** 2.0474 (15.99) *** 
Analyst       -0.6805 (-7.21) *** -0.5821 (-5.35) ***     
  
-0.6850 (-7.28) *** -0.5933 (-5.47) *** 
Fund       -10.6891 (-2.57) *** -12.1155 (-2.19) **     
  
-10.6397 (-2.54) ** -11.8917 (-2.16) ** 
Restricted       -0.1139 (-0.37) 
 
-0.7155 (-1.33) 
 
      -0.1007 (-0.32) 
 
-0.6559 (-1.21) 
 
Ownership       -1.9086 (-4.95) *** -1.7725 (-3.04) ***     
  
-1.9139 (-4.95) *** -1.7651 (-3.00) *** 
Duality       0.3521 (1.04) 
 
0.2685 (0.58) 
 
      0.3789 (1.12) 
 
0.2927 (0.64) 
 
Meeting       -0.1972 (-2.61) *** -0.1860 (-2.04) **     
  
-0.1774 (-2.35) ** -0.1685 (-1.85) * 
Bosize       0.0742 (0.92) 
 
0.0752 (0.69)      
  
0.0649 (0.81) 
 
0.0705 (0.64) 
 
Indep       -0.3610 (-4.19) *** -0.1861 (-1.69) *     
  
-0.3569 (-4.14) *** -0.1914 (-1.74) * 
Supsize       0.0601 (0.50) 
 
0.1243 (0.77) 
 
      0.0504 (0.43) 
 
0.1218 (0.77) 
 
Constant 13.9877 (15.01) *** 5.6618 (4.47) *** 6.3279 (2.77) *** 13.7383 (14.83) *** 5.1405 (4.08) *** 6.0920 (2.67) *** 
          
 
        
Industry effect   No     No     Yes     No 
    No     Yes   
Region effect   No     No     Yes     No 
    No     Yes   
Year effect   No     No     Yes     No 
    No     Yes   
Pseudo-R
2   0.1019 
    0.21 
    0.2259 
  
  0.0884     0.2109     0.2263   
Obs.   10,317     10,317     10,317     10,317     10,317     10,317 
  
          
 
   
   
  
This table presents the empirical results of following logistic regression model about the determinants of modified audit opinion (MAO) 
    
k
k tkktt
RegionIndustryYearControlEMMAO
1 ,110
 
which MAO is equal to 1 if a modified audit opinions are issued to indicates (potential) problems with a financial statement, and zero otherwise; the lack of executive integrity is 
measured by two proxies: EM is the ratio of non-operating income relative to revenue; and DEM is a dummy variable equal to one if EM is above the median value from the firms within 
the same industry in the same year, and zero otherwise.  Other control variables are defined in the Appendix. The sample period covers 2001 to 2008. All t-statistics are reported and 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The superscripts 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively.  
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Table 5 
Relationship between fraud and earnings management conditional on modified audit opinion (test of hypothesis H3) 
  Regression I Regression II Regression III Regression IV Regression V Regression VI 
MAO 2.4218 (20.1) *** 2.2543 (16.83) *** 2.3209 (16.36) *** 2.5852 (14.25) 
*** 2.3664 (12.37 *** 2.4390 (11.85) *** 
EM 3.2992 (4.71) *** 2.8999 (3.80) *** 3.3595 (4.33) ***     
              
DEM                 
  0.4595 (3.14) *** 0.3636 (2.48) ** 0.3777 (2.56) *** 
EM MAO -4.0126 (-4.36) *** -3.4746 (-3.63) *** -3.8494 (-4.05) ***     
              
DEM MAO                   -0.4994 (-2.25) 
** -0.3869 (-1.70) * -0.4117 (-1.77) * 
Size -0.3137 (-4.99) *** -0.2003 (-2.40) ** -0.0342 (-0.28) 
 -0.3121 (-4.92) *** -0.1998 (-2.40) ** -0.0362 (-0.30)  
PB 0.007 (0.79)   0.0035 (0.38)   0.0126 (1.15)  0.0085 (0.95)   0.005 (0.55)   0.0146 (1.33)  
ST       -0.3112 (-1.83) * -0.2680 (-1.56) 
       -0.2994 (-1.80) * -0.2449 (-1.43)  
Analyst       -0.5904 (-4.68) *** -0.6103 (-4.36) ***       -0.5891 (-4.71) 
*** 
-0.6062 (-4.36) *** 
Fund       -2.6351 (-1.00)   -3.0392 (-1.11) 
 
      -2.7468 (-1.03)   -3.1747 (-1.16)  
Restricted       0.049 (0.11)   -0.2317 (-0.42) 
 
      0.032 (0.07)   -0.2236 (-0.41)  
Ownership       -2.1577 (-4.06) *** -2.0691 (-3.13) ***       -2.131 (-4.03) 
*** 
-2.0358 (-3.09) *** 
Duality       -0.4818 (-0.94)   -0.3097 (-0.63) 
 
      -0.4779 (-0.93)   -0.2976 (-0.61) 
 
Meeting       -0.4441 (-4.11) *** -0.4528 (-4.07) ***       -0.4457 (-4.14) 
*** 
-0.4520 (-4.04) *** 
Bosize       0.008 (0.07)   -0.0707 (-0.53)        0.0001 (0.00)   -0.0814 (-0.61)  
Indep       -0.0605 (-0.48)   -0.0751 (-0.51)        -0.0663 (-0.53)   -0.0834 (-0.57)  
Supsize       -0.2223 (-1.34)   -0.2765 (-1.59)        -0.2262 (-1.37)   -0.2764 (-1.58)  
Constant 2.519 (1.96) ** 1.4006 (0.77)   -2.0364 (-0.77)  2.3032 (1.76)   1.2666 (0.69)   -2.0637 (-0.79)  
Industry effect   No 
    No     Yes     No 
    No     Yes   
Region effect   No 
    No     Yes     No 
    No     Yes   
Year effect   No 
    No     Yes     No 
    No     Yes   
Pseudo-R2   0.1525     0.1776     0.1944     0.1509     0.1759 
  
  0.1921   
Obs.   10,317     10,317     10317     10,317     10,317     10,317   
This table present the empirical results of the following logistic regression model 
     RegionIndustryYearControlMAOEMMAOEMFraud
k
k tkkttttt 3 ,132101  
where the one-year lead dependent dummy variable Fraud is equal to one if the firm is subject to regulatory enforcement against fraud, and zero otherwise; the lack of executive 
integrity is proxied by following two earning management measures; EM is the ratio of non-operating income relative to revenue; DEM is a dummy variable equal to one if EM is 
above the median value of the firms within the same industry of the same year, and zero otherwise; and MAO equals one if a modified audit opinion is issued by the auditor, which 
indicates (potential) problems with a financial statement, and zero otherwise. Other control variables are defined in the Appendix. The sample period covers 2001 to 2008. All t-
statistics are reported and adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Relationship between fraud and change in earnings management conditional on modified audit opinion (test of hypothesis H3) 
  Regression I Regression II Regression III 
ChEM 3.1601  (3.57) *** 2.8156  (3.11) *** 3.2223  (3.34) 
*** 
MAO 2.2810  (19.45) *** 2.1450  (16.05) *** 2.2091  (15.46) 
*** 
ChEM MAO -2.7065  (-2.7) *** -2.3220  (-2.27) *** -2.6762  (-2.44) 
** 
Size -0.3457  (-5.41) *** -0.2185  (-2.59) *** -0.0480  (-0.39) 
 
PB 0.0090  (0.99) 
 
0.0053  (0.57) 
 
0.0148  (1.32) 
 
ST 
  
 
-0.2972  (-1.78) * -0.2496  (-1.47) 
 
Analyst 
  
 
-0.5342  (-4.16) *** -0.5657  (-3.93) 
*** 
Fund 
  
 
-3.1508  (-1.16) 
 
-3.5358  (-1.25) 
 
Restricted 
  
 
0.1991  (0.44) 
 
-0.1045  (-0.18) 
 
Ownership 
  
 
-2.2729  (-4.21) *** -2.1906  (-3.26) 
*** 
Duality 
  
 
-0.4044  (-0.78) 
 
-0.2184  (-0.44) 
 
Meeting 
  
 
-0.4305  (-3.93) *** -0.4354  (-3.84) 
*** 
Bosize 
  
 
0.0368  (0.32) 
 
-0.0404  (-0.29) 
 
Indep 
  
 
-0.0508  (-0.4) 
 
-0.0460  (-0.31) 
 
Supsize 
  
 
-0.2619  (-1.55) 
 
-0.3082  (-1.72) * 
Constant 3.2632  (2.5) ** 1.7817  (0.96) 
 
-1.7087  (-0.64) 
 
Industry effect 
 
No 
  
No 
  
Yes 
 
Region effect 
 
No 
  
No 
  
Yes 
 Year effect 
 
No 
  
No 
  
Yes 
 Pseudo-R2 
 
0.1530 
  
0.1768 
  
0.1944 
 Obs.   9,678 
 
   9,678     9,678   
 
This table present the empirical results of the following logistic regression model 
     Region3 ,132101 IndustryYearControlMAOChEMMAOChEMFraud
k
k tkkttttt  
where the one-year lead dependent dummy variable Fraud is equal to one if the firm is subject to regulatory enforcement against fraud, and zero otherwise; the lack of executive 
integrity is proxied by the change of earnings management, ChEM which is the difference between EM in year t and EM in year t-1; MAO equals one if a modified audit opinion is 
issued by the auditor, which indicates (potential) problems with a financial statement, and zero otherwise. Other control variables are defined in the Appendix. The sample period 
covers 2001 to 2008. All t-statistics are reported and adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
